Supply Chain Security 

By: Dr. Michael Fritze, PIPS VP

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            The global CV-19 Pandemic has highlighted serious fragilities inherent in the US supply chain for critical items.   Medical supplies were impacted including PPE, drug components, testing and injection supplies etc. It became painfully clear that relying on uncertain overseas supplies of these critical materials was a major problem in times of crisis.   But the Pandemic impacted supply chains in many other important areas causing serious shortages in automobiles, building supplies, defense needs and a whole host of other industries.   The risks of relying on fragile supply chains were laid bare particularly the potential of getting cut off from critically needed supplied in times of crisis.   Supply chain security is inherently a global issue as the world has become so interconnected in recent decades.   The US needs strong Policy prescriptions to ensure our critically needed items have secure supply chains robust in times of crisis.

            We will use Microelectronics as a specific example of the supply chain issues that came up during the Pandemic, analyze their causes and propose some policy solutions to ensure more robustness going forward for this critical item. Microelectronics are a key part of both US economic strength as well as national security needs.   They are core to some of the most successful US companies and industries as well as forming critical parts of important defense systems. We simply cannot afford to get cut off from the supply of this critical technology in times of crisis.

            To understand the impact of the Pandemic on the Microelectronic supply chain, it is first important to understand key aspects of this industry and where the supply chain risks lie. Microelectronics was dominated by USG customers in its early development days ( ‘60s and ‘70s ).   Starting with the ‘80s, commercial applications started to become dominant ending up with a relatively tiny market share US Defense now has of around 1%.   So national security needs no longer drive the market and DOD needs to leverage & adapt commercial technology developments made for the consumer market.   Defense systems also have much longer time horizons that typical commercial applications leading to a challenging sustainment issue.    The key supply chain problem for US Defense is gaining guaranteed access to the wide variety of electronic chips it needs in a secure manner.  

The semiconductor industry is a highly globalized endeavor with key supply chain elements located around the world. (Fig. 1).   Note that the US is highly dependent on overseas suppliers for key SC elements including fabrication and packaging and test for example. (Fig. 2)   Chip fabrication is dominated by Asian companies including TSMC (in Taiwan) which holds a commanding 58% market share in the pure play foundry market. (Fig. 3) A major consolidation in SOTA fabrication capabilities has been occurring in Asia (TSMC, Samsung, etc). These Asian foundries are located in geopolitically risky areas presenting a high concentration of capability in very small geographic regions.  

China has also been making very large investments to develop their own domestic semiconductor capabilities [refs here] as they are currently highly dependent on imports in this key industry.   Large amounts of money are being spent on fabrication facilities as well as stimulation of domestic fabless design companies.   The Chinese have also convinced TSMC to build a modern Fab [ref] in Nanjing to help guarantee their access to advanced ME. These very large ME investments being made by China represent a major part of their global economic competition plan with the US.

Now that the industry basics have been covered, lets consider what impact the Pandemic had on semiconductor supply chains. When this crisis began, many industries hunkered down and cancelled their chip orders fearing a prolonged downturn.   This was particularly the case in the automotive sector.   At the same time chip demand for communications and computer technologies needed for home office use surged.   A perfect storm of supply shortage was thereby set up. Major economic impacts have been suffered by a number of key industries particularly the automotive sector. [ref] The chip shortage impact has been felt in many other industries as well. [ref]

The US is a capitalist economy strongly driven by market forces. These lead to a “just in time” supply chain strategy where companies are highly penalized for maintaining unsold inventories.   Unfortunately, this strategy fails badly in times of crisis like CV-19 where stockpiling would have been helpful. As a result, wide-spread chip shortages have resulted with major economic impacts.

How can we address the serious ME supply chain issues that the Pandemic has laid bare ?   There are no easy quick fixes here as fabrication capabilities take years and serious investment to develop.   It is also important to keep in mind that building extra Fab capacity for short term demand fluctuations will ultimately fail.   Prices will drop and these Fabs will not be economically viable in the long term.

So what can the US do to develop a more secure Microelectronics Supply Chain ? To start, we can recognize areas like fabrication and packaging/test in which our capabilities are limited and encourage more domestic efforts in these areas.   The pending “USICA” legislation in Congress aims to make significant investments ($52 B in the Senate Bill) in semiconductors aimed to encourage more domestic capabilities. We also need to work more closely with our allies with strong semiconductor capabilities ( ie Taiwan and S. Korea) to encourage them to set up shop in the US.

Finally, we need to discourage “just in time” supply chain behavior particularly in times of crisis for critical ME components.   One approach is a “take or pay” model in which such orders are guaranteed and free from last minute cancellation risks. In the semiconductor industry it is never wise to “lose one’s place in line” for critical parts as this could lead to long delays and shortages.   So it is important to first identify such critical parts and then develop policy to guarantee supply in times of crisis.

The Democratization of Technology and International Conduct

Col. Chuck O'Neill 

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In the current strategic environment, the United States competes for global leadership across multiple competencies, to include the economic, political, technological, and military sectors. The rapidity of technology distribution or democratization has most recently begun to level the playing field for international actors seeking to compete with and challenge US strategic primacy. Additionally, countries and non-state actors possessing advanced technologies may seek advantages over equally as well-equipped adversaries by playing by different rules or ignoring international norms of moral and ethical conduct.

This paper will briefly review the character of global competition and then summarize the impact of rapid advances in unmanned aerial system or drone technology. A brief discussion of the potential threat of synthetic bioweapons follows. These weapons may produce devastating effects when developed by adversaries who may be willing to use them contrary to established international law.

Competition is a fundamental aspect of international relations and a normal state of relations between political and economic actors.[i]  Global competition across the strategic environment is centuries old and not unique to the current era. However, in the Information Age, competition between and among nation states is more distributed, faster, and more impactful on the daily life of human beings worldwide. In addition, non-state actors, be they empowered individuals, multi-national corporations or transnational criminal and terrorist organizations routinely engage in the competition continuum.  

As states and non-state actors seek to protect and advance their own interests they will engage in both competition and cooperation where it is to their advantage. In general, states and in some cases non-state actors, compete across economic, military, geo-political, and informational areas but do not necessarily coordinate their efforts into a cohesive long-term plan or strategy.

Conflict is not the same as competition, but both can overlap. Some might argue that the conflict is an extension of, or intensified form of competition. On the other hand, a rational objective of geopolitical and military competition is to pursue national interests while avoiding armed conflict with competing states. Moreover, the military role during competition includes engagement activities with allied and partner nation militaries as well as the development and demonstration of advanced warfighting capabilities, all designed to deter potential adversaries from engaging in malevolent activities.

The rapid global distribution of technology to and by both state and non-state actors has and will continue to arm our competitors with the capability and to a lesser degree the capacity to challenge US national interests. Rapid and continuing advances in a number of areas to include unmanned and autonomous systems and biotechnology will pose challenges to a rules-based international order. Nations and individual actors who do not subscribe to the same ethical standards as the U.S. and its partners and allies can steal a march in competition and conflict without possessing absolute technical superiority or even parity.  

Our unprecedented and growing global interconnectedness is both a source of cooperation between nations and a driving force in international competition. The accelerating dispersion of technology presents potential challenges not only to U.S. global leadership in competition but may enable our competitors with at least transitory lethal advantages should competition rise to the level of armed conflict. Two examples follow.

In a July 7 article in Defense One, Zak Kallenborn reported that in the most recent conflict with Hamas, Israel employed the first combat “true drone swarm.” While not particularly sophisticated the swarm involved a small number of drones that located well-hidden targets for indirect fires.[ii] The application was distinct from just simultaneous employment of multiple drones like air-launched decoys or those used against Syrian air defenses in 2019.[iii] In this case, the drones formed an integrated weapons system guided by Artificial Intelligence (AI) to communicate, collaborate, and make collective decisions about where to go and what to do.

Proliferation of technology, accessibility of materials, and ease of manufacture suggest that drones can be in the hands of most persons and groups throughout the world. Innovations like 3D printing will allow the construction of drone swarms by a small number of trained individuals in remote locations. Once launched they are difficult to detect but even if some drones in a swarm are disabled or destroyed future swarms will be able to self-heal, recomposing on the move while maintaining swarm integrity and mission focus.[iv]

Small, large in numbers, guided by AI and internal line of site communications; drone swarms collectively will become hard to defend against, integrated weapons systems.  In theory, drone formations could number in the thousands, exceed the capacity of human cognition, and require advanced AI and machine learning to control them.  AI controlled drone swarms will be able to conduct  multi-axis, multi-domain combined attacks with a variety of on board and off board kinetic and non-kinetic weapons and payloads.

Certainly, the U.S. will compete with China and other competitors in the development of AI, machine learning and their coupling with drone technology and AI. However, there are ethical considerations about the employment of autonomous systems to consider.

Currently our unmanned vehicle operations require a man in the loop or on the loop to conduct kinetic strikes. What will be our response when AI enabled swarms are able to seek out and decide what targets to attack without a human in the kill chain or decision cycle? At what point will we determine that it is to our advantage and ethical to allow the machine to make lethal decisions on its own? If we fail to accelerate the kill chain through machine decision algorithms, will potential adversaries see our hesitancy as an exploitable vulnerability?  Will we cede the advantage to adversarial competitors, including proxy forces or terrorists who feel no compunction about allowing autonomous machines make decisions about lethal force? Who, what and when to kill? Given the opportunity, near peer or peer competitors, to include Russia and China will embrace this potential advantage.

Perhaps more insidious than the coupling of AI with drone technology are developments in biotechnology that present strategic and ethical challenges. In the June issue of the U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, Michael Knutzen asserts that the potential exists for the creation of next generation bioweapons that tailor biologic fires in the human domain against which we are not prepared to defend. He points to recent infections by COVID-19 on the USS Theodore Roosevelt and Frances Charles de Gaulle demonstrate our military’s vulnerability to biological events.[v]

Since 1985, scientists have been capable of copying DNA and using it to produce genetic modifications in other organisms. The more recent development of the Clustered Regularly Interspaced Short Palindromic Repeat (CRISPR) technique allows faster and more precise genetic editing. Scientists can now design and insert completely new traits into organisms that produce “novel effects, mechanisms and processes”.[vi] Adversaries could weaponized such technology to target specific populations or individuals with synthetic organisms to produce customized illnesses, debilitating cognitive effects or death.

By harnessing DNA data, synthetic biological weapons (SBW) can be tailored to deliver effects through social transmission with much greater precision than traditional bioweapons. SBWs can take on some of the characteristics of precision kinetic weapons using high pay-off aim points such as group ethnicity.[vii] Predetermined asymptomatic social pathways or routes can be used to transmit binary weapons that only produce effects when separate transmissions merge. Two halves of a synthetic weapon carried by witting or unwitting hosts may be joined to produce severe effects on a target population. This could be devastating to military formations forward deployed during routine operations in competition or when responding to crisis at or below the level of conflict. Targeting naval vessels or congested waypoints such as SPODs, APODs, or reception and staging locations would have great impact.

While the possibility of bioterrorism-induced epidemics has long been a security threat to the world, SBWs change the risk versus gain calculus in favor of malevolent actors through precision targeting. During competition, if SBWs produce limited collateral damage and mask attribution, gaining consensus for retribution will be difficult for the affected group. Similar to COVID-19, determining SBW origins will likely be hard to identify, difficult to attribute, and problematic for retaliation. As with other hybrid or gray zone activities, effective deterrence will be hard to muster and fear of escalation may take retribution off the table.  

The 1972 Biological Weapons Convention, to which the United States, its allies and potential peer adversaries subscribe, prohibits the development and use of biological weapons. We could assume that most or all of our allies and partners will adhere to the convention, but others may not. The Chinese for instance play by different rules and a number of their highly regarded military strategic thinkers have written of biotechnology as another dimension of warfare. They have shown an increasing “…interest in biology as an emerging domain of warfare, guided by strategists who talk about “genetic weapons” and the possibility of a bloodless victory.”[viii] Other malign actors able to achieve expertise in synthetic bioweapons and the ability to employ them with little risk of attribution may do so. SBWs may render targets ineffective before they are aware of the attack and even if successfully attributed, mustering a legitimate military response during competitions may seem excessive and disproportionate.

In the current era or Information Age, the distribution of technology is far reaching and proceeding at an exponential pace. Technologies such as drones coupled with AI, or CRISPR gene sequencing techniques continue to advance and are gaining widespread distribution. Malevolent states and potentially non-state actors have and will acquire technologies and weapons that challenge our pursuit of national interests. Moreover, they may hold our and forward deployed diplomatic corps and military forces at risk. This risk will be aggravated when malign actors fail to adhere to accepted international norms of conduct or when they apply their own interpretation to established conventions. Our ethical concerns and adherence to international law may cede the initiative and at least temporary advantages to adversaries who compete by different rules than western democracies.

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The Democratization of Technology and International Conduct

Col. Chuck O'Neill

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[i] U.S. Marine Corps, Competing, MCDP 1-4, (Washington, D.C. Department of the Navy, 14 December 2020)

[ii] Zak Kallenborn, “Israel’s Drone Swarm over Gaza Should Worry Everyone: It’s time global leaders’ rules for those future weapons already being used to kill,” Defense One, 7 July 2021.

[iii] Sebastien Roblin, “Israeli Secret Kamikaze Drones are Killing Syria’s air Defenses,” National Interest, 19 May 2019.

[iv] Zachary Kallenborn, “Meet the future weapon of mass destruction, the drone swarm,” https://thebulletin.org/2021/04/meet-the-future-of-mass-destruction-the-drone-swarm/, Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, 5 April 2021

[v] Michael Knutzen, “Synthetic Bioweapons Are Coming,” Proceedings, U.S. Naval Institute, June 2021. 

[vi] Ibid.

[vii] Elsa B. Kania and Wilson Vorndick. “Weaponizing Biotech: How China’s Military is Preparing for a ‘New Domain of Warfare’,” Defense One,14 August 2019.

[viii] Ibid.

Maintaining the Competitive Posture of the United States in an Turbulent Economic Era

The Honorable Alan R. Shaffer

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Paul Kennedy’s 1987 book, “The Rise and Fall of Great Powers” laid out the case that throughout history, Great Powers fell into decline when their economic power failed to support their military and political ambitions.  In other words, ways, ends, and means for a strategy fell out of balance.  Though Kennedy’s thesis has not been proven entirely correct, the basic premise stands.  It is therefore appropriate to ask the question:  What is the current condition of the United States, and how will these conditions effect the United States ability to be competitive in a new era of global competition?

 

There are three elements of national power: economic, military, and political power.  Economic and military power tend to support political power, so we will focus on the state of the economy and the state of the military.  For the economy, it is important to address both the near-term economy, and the investment in those elements that would support a continued competitive stature —science, technology, and engineering.   In this paper, we will show areas that are a concern for United States global competitiveness; and there are growing fissures that could erode the competitive posture of the United States.

 

Economic:

The United States economy in 2021 is on a trajectory to erode the competitive stature of the United States.  Put in simple terms, the United States is living beyond its means.  The United States debt is at $28.6T, the largest in U.S. history.  Even more troubling is that the ratio of debt to GDP is also the highest in history, at 128.38%[i].  The peak of the debt to GDP ratio following World War II was 114%.  And with the current projections of spending and revenue in the U.S., the trend is getting worse.  A September 2020 report by the Congressional Budget Office[ii] projects that the debt will continue to grow for the next 30 years, reaching 200% of GDP by 2050.

 Why does debt matter?  For several reasons, but we will focus on one of the more significant problems with debt, the cost to “Service” the debt. In short, the cost to “Service” the debt continues to rise.   In 2020, the United States paid $522B to service the debt—at very low interest rates (2.4% in 2019 and 1.3% in 2020).[iii] The American Institute for Economic Research suggests that inflation could be between 5-6% for 2021.[iv]  This would strongly increase the cost of servicing United States debt.   A 2019 study projected the cost to service the debt will be larger than the Defense Budget by 2025.  While we really don’t know when the cost of servicing the debt will be more than the annual defense budget, it is clear that the United States will soon reach this dubious milestone.[v]  This is a situation that is neither sustainable nor acceptable when considering American competitiveness.

Equally troubling for the long-term economic viability of the United States is the growth in “mandatory” spending as opposed to discretionary spending.  Mandatory spending (social security, Medicaid / Medicare, etc.) has risen from about 25% of the federal outlays in 1962 to an estimated 65% in 2025.[vi] In constant dollars the buying power of the discretionary budget has remained fairly constant since the early 1990’s, but mandatory budgets continue to climb rapidly. Therefore, there is less and less opportunity for the government to begin to retire debt without restructuring mandatory spending programs—which is not a path politicians seem to want to tread.  To effectively retire the debt, there will need to be fundamental changes to programs like social security, Medicare, Medicaid, and so forth.  This is unlikely, but without it, retiring the debt will have to come at the expense of discretionary spending, of which Defense is roughly 50%.

Another economic issue is also a converged national security and economic challenge: supply chain vulnerability in National Security sectors.  This issue is categorized as an economic issue because in several sectors critical to national defense, the nation does not produce or manufacture sufficient supply to meet the demand.  There are two significant national security sectors with significant supply chain issues that need to be addressed.   The two are Microelectronics and Rare Earth Elements. 

  • Microelectronic Supply Chain Vulnerability
    Currently, the United States only produces 12% of the world supply of microelectronics, and very little at State of the Art (roughly under 14nm).  By 2030, the Semiconductor Industry Association predicts that the United States share of global production will decrease to 10%, while China and Taiwan will produce 50% of global microelectronics.  Since the US consumes about 48% of the world semiconductor market, the United States must use non-domestically produced chips.  When a product is something that can be visually inspected (metals for instance), this is not really a problem. When the product can’t be visually inspected, like microelectronics, there is a significantly increased risk of potential adversaries inserting either software or hardware “bugs” that could conceivably give the adversary “control” over the chip—a chip that could be used to control systems or allow access.  An adversary could turn systems on or off remotely.  The recent shutdown of the Colonial Pipeline occurred when Russian hackers took control of the pipeline operating systems.  Suppose that this were not a hacker group, but a group enabled by nondomestic chips with backdoors embedded. 

    We have heard some in the United States say “the United States can’t be competitive in things like microelectronics”.  This is a shortsighted view.  When the very national security of a nation is dependent upon a product, there is really no choice but to spend what is needed to ensure economic and security self-sufficiency.  In 2021 the Senate passed the United States Innovation and Competition Act (USICA), which provides $52B for microelectronics to attempt to increase domestic production.  The House has not yet acted on this bull, which is likely only a down-payment to address manufacture.  This is probably only a down payment.  If the US defines self-sufficiency as available domestically or from very trusted partners., passage of USICA is a must accomplish task for Congress.

  • Rare Earth Elements
    The same is true in rare earth elements, which by some estimates, China controls 97% of the global supply.[vii]  They could turn off the supply at the moment of their choosing, thereby using access to materials as a strategic lever.  This is not an acceptable position for the United States as rare earths provide real capabilities needed by the Department of Defense. 

There is a final economic megatrend that must be addressed.  In a healthy economy, the gap between the very rich and very poor tends to decrease—a solid economy raises all boats.  The United States, as measured by the Gini index, is going in the wrong direction.  The 2020 Census Bureau report of income inequality shows the Gini Index in the United States has grown from .36 in the late 60’s to .46 today—basically, the gap between rich and poor continues to grow.  This is significant, because the Gini coefficient is very strongly correlated with community violence; violence leads to social unrest.[viii]  In general, greater income inequality tends to support social unrest.  The higher the Gini coefficient, the greater the income inequality.  In 2020, according to Statista, the United States had the 32nd highest Gini Coefficient of 130 largest nations; only one NATO nation had a higher Gini coefficient, and hence more inequality than the United States than the United States—Turkey.  The United States income inequality now is more like a third world nation than advanced liberal democracy.   If this trend is not reversed, the United States risks continued growing social unrest, putting United States global competitiveness at risk.

 

Thus, to summarize the United States economy, the United States is deeply in debt, with increasing mandatory federal spending, with fragile embedded supply chains and growing income inequality.  This leaves some very hard choices—how to reduce the federal debt while simultaneously shifting federal funds from nondiscretionary to discretionary funding and addressing income inequality.  If the United States is to remain competitive, it will have to address these problems.

 

 

Military: 

In August 2021, ADM Chris Acquilino, Commander USINDOPACOM stated at the Aspen Security Conference that the United States still has the finest military in the world.  By all measures, he is correct.  Unfortunately, there are several troubling signs for the United States military when considering long term competition.  Among the most troubling is that the Department of Defense has deferred modernization of conventional platforms for a number of years—essentially since the end of the Cold War.  Mackenzie Eaglen details these issues in her March 2021 report on “The 2020’s Tri-Service Modernization Crunch”.   The Department of Defense has more weapons systems in the pipeline than there is currently funding to support.  A lot of the modernization bow-wave issues have arisen due to continued deferral of modernization programs.  The reasons these deferrals occurred is straightforward, and as individual decisions were logical.  The compound effect over time has left the United States with a number of ageing and expensive platforms that need to be replaced simultaneously.  As the Warsaw Pact fell in the early 1990’s, the nation took a “peace dividend”; moving into the 21st century, the focus of the United States shifted from conventional to counter insurgency warfare.  This focus lasted nearly 20 years.  The Department was further constrained legislatively by the “Budget Control Act” of 2011.  Because of this, the United States has a number of very large modernization programs coming into the phase of their development where there are large increases in funding requirements.

 

As an example, consider nuclear modernization.  Currently, the United States is modernizing all three legs of the Triad, with the Ground Based Strategic Deterrent replacing Minuteman-III; the Columbia class submarine replacing the Ohio class; The B-21 Raider and Long-Range Strike Option replacing the B-2 and Air Launched Cruise Missile.  Minuteman III was initially fielded in 1970 with an expected missile life of 10 years.  Through several “Service Life Extension Programs”, the missile has remained viable, but there is no more viable extension available, according to ADM Chas Richards, Commander of Stratcom.[ix]  The Ohio class submarine was first fielded in1981; the first will be replaced in 2031.  The previous submarine with the longest in commission time was the USS Bremerton, which served 40 years. A similar situation exists with the air launched cruise missile, which was commissioned in the early 1980’s with a 10-year life expectancy.  They will not be replaced until the late 2020’s.  The overall expected cost of the nuclear modernization program is estimated at $1.2T.  In May 2021, the Congressional Budget Office estimated the cost of nuclear modernization over just the period 2021 to 2030 to be $634B.  When the overall average total DoD RDT&E and Procurement Budget Request is about $250B per year, nuclear modernization will consume over 25% of the total DoD RDT&E and Procurement budget.  But, Nuclear Modernization is the bedrock of the United States defense.  The Strategic Deterrent has prevented a large-scale conventional warfare since 1945.  That makes the deterrent a bargain.

 

Simultaneously, there are standard airplane procurements (to include Full Rate Production of the F-35, the KC-46, and Next Generation Air Dominance Fighter, plus Virginia Class Submarines, Ford Class Aircraft carrier, Missile Defense, and the list goes on and an.  It is apparent that to complete all the programs in the pipeline will take more money.  Eaglen estimates covering the complete bill would require a 3-5% increase in defense spending every year over the decade.  The Fiscal Year 2022 budget request of the Biden administration did not even keep pace with inflation.  While it appears that Congress will appropriate more than the request, it will not be the 3-5% required, and given the overall economic realities of the United States, it is not likely that the Defense Budget will grow at 3-5% increase year over year. 

 

To compound the issue, the continued increases in “entitlements” (retired pay, health costs for retirees, etc.) further exacerbates the problem.  For instance, from 2020 to 2021, the cost of pay, housing and benefits grew by 5%, while force size only grew 1%.[x] Major General Arnold Punaro (Ret) has recently pointed out that the fully burdened cost of a mid-career person has ballooned from $80K to $400K per servicemember in the last twenty years.[xi]  There are a lot of reasons for this—rising health care costs, retirees that are living longer, more retirees than active force, and so forth.  The result is that each year, personnel and retiree costs eat a little more of the Defense Budget, actually eroding buying power.  There needs to be a serious review of how to control these costs. 

 

Instead of continued defense budget growth, a realistic likely scenario is that the Nation will shift some resources from the Department of Defense budget to address social programs or to retire some deficit, or to do both.  If there is a budget decline in the Department of Defense, the way the DoD has reacted to reductions in the past led to a hollowing of the force—one that does not have money to train or maintain the systems. The hollow force should not be acceptable to anyone in America.  The force America has should be ready to fight.  How much capability America has should be a function of what America can afford?  In the past, this has not been the case.    If the United States should begin to address the overall economic conditions (budget deficit) outlined above, we will have to recognize that the Department of Defense makes up slightly more than 50% of the discretionary budget.  Can the nation begin to become a more significant economic power without cutting Defense spending?  This is one of the strategic decisions before America. 

 

So, if a defense budget contraction occurs, what needs to be done?  The DoD needs to start with a complete bottom-up review to better align capabilities bought with capabilities needed.  The Marine Corps did this in their 2022 budget request—and in so doing, retired a number of systems (to include all main battle tanks).  The warfight of the future will be different, and yet the DoD budget is still largely platform centric.  People talk of a 355 ship Navy; in 2019, the Center for Strategic and Budget Analysis presented a study saying the Air Force needed to grow to 386 squadrons—an increase by about 50 squadrons.  Instead of talking in terms of numbers of platforms, the discussion should start with what the Nation needs the  Department of Defense to do.  Several near-term things need to be implemented as a way to control cost and increase agility.  The DoD has to embrace digital engineering for all acquisition programs.  The DoD has to embrace open systems architectures for all acquisitions.  The Services are moving in these directions.  They need to accelerate.  Finally, the budget needs to focus more on combat enablers (electronic warfare, all domain command and control, cyber (offensive and defensive), to posture for future fights.  We still believe in the deterrence of the nuclear triad, but one can think about the numbers of warheads. 

 

Finally, a lot of people point to a broken acquisition system.  It could be made better.  But acquisition starts with the requirements process, and needs to include system prototyping that will address manufacture and sustainment of new systems—not just technology demonstrations.  With the coming budget crunch, if it occurs, the Military will have to do a bottom-up review of capability and platform, while continuing to overhaul bureaucratic process and addressing costs of the force.  This will also not be easy.

 

 

Investment Balance—Today (Social Programs and Defense) or Tomorrow (Science and Technology):

Historically, both economic and military strength are rooted in scientific discovery and adoption.  Consider the impact of the semiconductor and computers.  These two interrelated industries were driven by investment by the United States and led to the creation of the transistor, then semiconductors, and computers.  In large part, the dissolution of the Soviet Union occurred as they fell behind in technology and had to spend more money than they had to retain some military viability. In the 1980’s, the Soviet Union was about three generations behind the United States in high end computers.[xii] As the United States adopted semiconductors in computers, IR sensors, reconnaissance satellites, and so forth, the Soviet Union could not keep up.  The basis of United States military and economic power in the 1980’s and 1990’s was built on the back of semiconductors.  Semiconductors were built based on a large federal investment in science in the post-World War II era.

 

 

Unfortunately, United States leadership in science and technology has eroded over time.  I do acknowledge that some believe the world is stabilized with a global science and technology base.  That may be true, nut there is no way to prove or disprove this.    We also acknowledge that some data on science and technology leadership does suggest the United States is still preeminent. In fact, the United States still has the largest expenditure (federal and industrial) in R&D[xiii] with $549B total investment.  But China and the EU both have been putting more emphasis on R&D.  From 2000 to 2017 the investment by the United States fell from 56% of the total R&D investment in 2000 to 37% in 2017.  Thus, the combined investment by China and the EU has outpaced the United States.   This National Science Foundation  also points out that  federal R&D funding has fallen from 1.9% of the federal budget in the 1960’s to .7% today.  Finally, in 1960, total United States investment in S&T accounted for two-thirds of the total world investment, a figure that has fallen to 29 percent in 2019.  On the whole, growth in S&T globally is a good thing, but the trends are clear, the preeminence of the United States is waning and the conclusion is that future significant discovery may not come from the United States.   So, the United States competitive advantage in S&T investment is waning.

 

What about focus?  President Xi has led a very focused effort to increase Chinese stature in knowledge creation, and specifically called out sectors of interest.  When Xi rolled out the 14th five-year plan, covering 2021 to 2026 in March 2021, Xi specifically cited the need for China to develop independent innovation [xiv] Xi specifically said “New-generation information technologies, represented by artificial intelligence, quantum information science, mobile telecommunications, the Internet of Things, and blockchain are accelerating breakthrough applications. The realm of life sciences, represented by synthetic biology, gene editing, brain science, and regenerative medicine, is giving birth to new changes. The new manufacturing technologies of integrated robotics, digitalization, and new materials are accelerating the manufacturing industry's shift toward intelligent systems, focusing on services, and eco-friendliness. The development of clean, high-efficiency, and sustainable energy technologies is accelerating and will usher in a global energy revolution. Space and maritime technologies are expanding the frontiers of where humans can live and work. In sum, creative breakthroughs in areas such as information technology, life sciences, manufacturing, energy, space, and maritime are supplying ever more wellsprings of innovation for cutting-edge and disruptive technologies”.[xv] This is a level of focus at a senior level that we don’t see in the United States, EU, or other friendly nations.

There are two other elements of competitiveness that need to at least be mentioned: Research Intensity and STEM and first-degree awards.  To remain competitive in a global sense in S&T, the nation has to be perceived as being supportive of R&D, as measured by R&D investment as a percentage of GDP.  This is research intensity.  In 2000, only Japan had a higher R&D intensity that the United States; by 2017, Germany, South Korea, Japan had surpassed the United States, and China was getting close.  Simply, other nations are valuing S&T more—a fact that will likely impact future competitiveness of the United States.  Similarly, in first university degree in S&T, in 2000, the United States produced about the same number as the EU, with China producing about ½ the number as the United States.  By 2017, China was producing more than double the number of new scientists and engineers (about 1.7M / year). 

So, to summarize the trends in science and technology competitiveness, the rest of the world (led by China) have increased their S&T investment relative to the United States, in both total dollars and R&D intensity, while producing more scientists and engineers.   All of these “indicators” increase the likelihood that the United States will not be the first developer of tomorrow’s significant technology for the military and economy. 

 

Options: 

The premise of this paper is that the United States has some significant issues that have to be addressed to retain its position as a leader in global competition.   In fact, the picture may seem bleak.  To be sure,  “competitors” to the United States also have significant economic, military, and political issues to deal with.  But, it is clear that some structural issues have to be dealt with by the United States.  At the top level, several steps have to be taken:

  • Begin to control the overall budget deficit.  The United States has to retire some of the total debt or the nation will soon be paying more for interest than defense of the nation.  This probably won’t be realistic without reduction of the overall mandatory outlays of the budget.  This could be done by a structured reduction in “entitlements” or an increase in funds available—presumably through increased tax.  The economic competitiveness is even more at question without increasing the investment in the future.  None of this will be easy, but the debt has to be dealt with.  With any new tax structure, it must be done in a way that does not increase income inequality.
  • The investment by the Department of Defense has to be given a serious bottoms-up-review.  To date, the DoD has not really asked the question—what capabilities does the DoD need for the future. Future combat will likely be much more cyber and digitally centered.  Electronics warfare, cyber warfare, and autonomous systems will likely replace large monolithic ground and air platforms.  Finally, the DoD must follow industry and adopt open systems,  Finally, the United States must draw back on some unilateral military deployments, and reduce overall force size, using automation to offset personnel. 
  •  Increase federal investment in R&D in real terms, or incentivize industrial investment in research, and publish a viable national strategic plan, with foci, just as Xi did with the 14th five-year plan.

The steps are easy to write down, but implementation would be very difficult and would force a change to current programmatic and trajectories.  Further, at the macro level, the ability to address these problems comes down to balancing overall outlays with goals and means of the Nation.  The simultaneous need to address these issues needs to start a national debate, but action cannot continue to be deferred.    

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Maintaining the Competitive Posture of the United States in an Turbulent Economic Era

The Honorable Alan R. Shaffer

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[i] Data valid as of 4 Aug 2021

[ii] The 2020 Long-Term Budget Outlook, Congressional Budget Office, 21 Sept 2021

[iv] Dwyer, Gerald. “How High Will Inflation Be in 2021”, American Institute for Economic Research, Aug 6, 2021

[v] Boccia, Romina Jan 2019 “By 2025, US Interest Payments on the National Debt will Pass the Defense Budget.  The National Interest

[vi] Mandatory Spending Since 1962, Congressional Research Service report March 2015, Leavit, Austin and Stupek

[vii] Dreyer, Jane Truefel “China’s Monopoly on Rare Earth Elements, and Why We Should Care: Foreign Policy Research Institute, 7 Oct 2020.

[viii] Luther, David: “New FBI Data Correlates City Crime to Income Inequality: October 9, 2017

[ix] Everstine, Brian.   STRATCOM Welcomes Nuke Review, but Says Minuteman III Life Extension Should Not be Considered.  Air Force Magazine, Jan 5, 2021

[x] Shine, Leo.  Rising Military Personnel Costs May Mean Future Personnel Reductions.  Military Times, 25 Aug 2020.

[xi] Punaro, Arnold Maj Gen (Ret), 2021, “The Ever Shrinking Fighting Force”, Punaro Press.

[xii] Shaffer, observation as an analyst working at the Foreign Technology Directorate, Wright Patterson AFB, 1984-1987. 

[xiii] National Science Foundation, 2020 Science and Engineering Indicators

[xiv] Ben Murphy, Rogier Creemers, Elsa Kania, Paul Triolo, Kevin Neville, and Graham Webster, Stanford Cyber Policy Center, “Xi Jinping: 'Strive to Become the World’s Primary Center for Science and High Ground for Innovation', March 18, 2021

[xv] ibidIn 20

The Challenges and Opportunities of Strategic Messaging in Societal Level Competition

Curtis Pearson

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As we look at the United States’ societal level engagement in global competition, we need to carefully consider strategic communications, that is, the narrative we are trying to construct, and how it is being perceived and processed by our competitors and allies. 

Introduction

Developing a strategic messaging campaign that provides a plan for constructing and articulating a narrative of the US position in a clear and consistent way is crucial to US success in global competition. In today’s world of rapid and unconstrained communication, we cannot afford for our competitors or allies to receive an unintended variation or the opposite of an intended message because we failed to develop a reasoned approach to communicating on the global stage or account for the cultural filters and experiences of the audience.  

The lack of clear and most important – consistent messaging will put the US at a distinct disadvantage in the global landscape and drive unintended outcomes and events. This idea involves reshaping not only the external message, but also the conversations we have with ourselves a nation.

Background and Examples

I will be focusing on the Peoples Republic of China in my examples because it is where I have the most experience, having done business in China and with companies owned by the PLA. However, the elements of creating a strategic narrative are the same regardless of who we are trying to communicate with, it is the filters, experiences, and motivations of the audiences that change.

There was an extensive study[1] conducted for the DOD in 2013 that focused on Chinese decision making and decision makers in relation to space. What it showed was that through our public and private communications, which were intended to convince the Chinese not weaponize space, had the exact opposite effect. It pushed them into believing they needed to accelerate their programs and to view the US as untrustworthy because of what they saw as contradictory messages. The reason, the study concluded, that this happened was our messaging did not take into account the background and experiences of the decision makers we were trying to influence or how they, from a Chinese perspective, would interpret and analyze our statements and actions.

In 1990’s the US decided to send China a message of support for Taiwan and our uncontested control of the seas by running a carrier through the Taiwan Straits. The intention of this event had the exact opposite effect. Failing to take into account the mainland Chinese emotional and historical connection to the island of Taiwan Province (as they call it). Instead of backing off the PLA increased their exercises and “test firings” of missiles into the straits to influence the Taiwanese elections. One can also make a direct link between the carrier event and the acceleration and deployment of the DF 2X missile programs, which have significantly complicated the US ability to operate freely within tactical ranges of the Taiwan and the Chinese coasts.   

 Without a doubt, China is an adversary, and likely, the one with the greatest potential to result in armed conflict. As a nation we need to be prepared to fight and win that conflict should it occur, but we also need to work to avoid it.

The US has taken a decidedly aggressive posture in how it talks about China in official publications. Take for example, the 2018 NDS for example which uses the following language WRT to China, “predatory economic practices to intimidate its neighbors while militarizing features in the South China Sea.”[2]

The 2021 Interim National Security Strategy Guidance speaks of our “Growing rivalry with China” and calls them “the only competitor capable of potentially combining it’s economic, diplomatic, military, and technological power to mount a sustained challenge to a stable and open international system[3]

It is difficult to find fault with either of these statements, however, given the weight they carry by being in these two documents, we need to consider how the Chinese would view and react to them.

What we refer to as “predatory economic practices” might to a Chinese viewer, look a lot like the US play book before and during the Cold War.  How many countries allied themselves with the US in the Cold War based on the promise of investment and access to US markets? How is that then different from the Chinese investing $4B in Ghanaian infrastructure (with a GDP of $74B) in return for exclusive access to strategic materials?  From a percentage of GDP standpoint, that is the equivalent of fully funding the infrastructure bill currently under consideration in congress. Predatory practice or sound strategic maneuvering depends on which side of the fence you sit.

China’s viewpoint on what we call “militarization of the South China Seas” is to them part of their self-appointed role in supporting regional safety and security. No different than US basing in Guam, Diego Garcia, or Okinawa. This also provides another example of unintended consequences of how we have messaged our actions. In the last two decades The US Navy has made several “Freedom of Navigation” transits in the South China Sea. Failure to take the right actions during these transits and failure of a consistent parallel messaging scheme has resulted in these passages being viewed as “Innocent Passage”[4] which strengthens the Chinese claim to sovereignty along the 9-dash line.

One instance of how we can avoid it is by changing the language and focus of the conversation we are having as a country.

Referring back to the NSS guidance, a message that talks about engaging China effectively as a member of the international community and recognizing the deep and broad interconnections of our economies could be much more effective than having your primary national strategy statement accuse them of trying to destabilize the entire international system.

China for the last few decades has been the favorite bogeyman for both political parties. We continue to paint China as the bad guy in an “us versus them” world. What we fail to recognize is that we can treat China as a both a fierce competitor and a friend rather than just a competitor and adversary.

This is not to suggest that the US does not push back on our global competitors’ critical issues such the Ukrainian independence, the South China Sea, human rights, or access to strategic resources. There are ways to push even harder and more effectively, by taking a subtler, coordinated, strategic approach. We must also recognize that we are facing Global competitors that view the world through different filters than the US. In many cases, such as China, they are comfortable working in a state of tension between competition and partnering. The US can use this to just advantage, defusing the open tensions with our competitors and looking less like the aggressor, while still preparing for potential military conflict. 

A coherent, consistent strategic narrative and messaging campaign will also be necessary to combat adversarial use of perception management and strategic deception.

The Chinese have historically made considerable use of strategic deception and perception management. A 2009 study prepared for the US-China Economic and Security Review Commission points out that, “if China can discern its competitor’s thought process through intelligence and guide it through deception and perception management, then it stands to reap considerable benefits as it pursues its own goals on domestic and international fronts.”[5] This certainly calls into question how we should view China’s actions and messages for example the ASAT demonstration in the last decade. Was this just a demonstration of capability, a deception mask of their true capacity in space weaponization, or a message on how the US has forced the peace loving Chinse government to weaponize space? Perhaps some combination of the three.  Regardless, The US needs to be considering these issues, understand their purpose and objectives, and use them to inform our own strategic messaging and counter messaging as these events occur.

These are examples based primarily on one competitor, but the approach to engagement and messaging is the same, regardless of whether we are talking about China, Russia, or our allies. The lack of a stable strategic narrative puts us at risk of alienating our allies and driving our competitors into a more aggressive and unintended response to our actions in furthering our national objectives.

Challenges

While there are multiple challenges associated with creating an enduring, effective strategic narrative at the global level, the two most significant are consistency over time and clarity from an audience perspective.

Consistency may be the most difficult aspect in maintaining a coherent messaging campaign that does not make the US look as if it is changing its message or suddenly giving a counter message that will cause confusion and distrust among our adversaries and allies. What makes this aspect so challenging is the tectonic shifts that happen every 2 to 4 years in Washington. Our adversaries tend to think in much longer cycles and in the cases of Russia and China don’t have to deal with the disruption of free elections changing senior leadership. If the US is to succeed it must establish a clear messaging campaign that can survive the assured changes in congressional and executive leadership. The strategic objectives and messages established must be non-partisan in nature if they will survive these inevitable shifts in leadership.

Clarity is a matter of understanding the audience and crafting the communications in such a way that the message maintains coherency after it passes through the cultural and experiential filters of the intended audience. This requires a clear and in depth understanding of not only who the intended recipient is, but how their filters and experiences will impact their perception of the meaning behind the message. Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin have very different cultures and perspectives, how they process the US messaging will be different and that must be considered. The same can be said for the wider audience of the citizens of their nations. The US must understand who the target audience is and how to best influence that audience. We must also engage the right kinds of expertise in crafting the most effective messages to influence the intended audience.

Conclusion

For the country to be successful in this fast-paced societal level global competition, need to create the narrative that best supports the US position in the Global Commons The first step in the process is developing a common understanding of our national objectives. What are the goals? What does success look like? What is the future state nation is trying to achieve?

Once these objectives have been established, defining a program and path forward must be developed along the lines of:

  • Defining and analyzing the target audience, both as groups and individuals
  • Defining the messages that are most likely to influence them, considering how they will perceive and interpret those messages
  • Develop the methodology and put in place the feedback mechanism to determine the effectiveness of the strategic messaging
  • Develop the communications pathways best suited to engaging target the audiences
  • Measure and analyze the messaging efforts and adapt the tactical and operational level actions as it progresses and the global situation changes

This effort will require the involvement of some nontraditional expertise in developing and executing messaging campaigns. 

An uncomplicated narrative that supports these goals needs to be developed in strictly nonpartisan way such that they can survive changes in administration and congressional balance.

This strategic narrative can also help to support the conversation within the nation as social media virtuosos’ expertise whip saws from medical, to national security, to constitutional law and back again as national conversations change topics.

The US must be consistent in maintaining and controlling that narrative at home and abroad, including being prepared to combat the inexorable disinformation that will across the numerous communications pathways that exist in today’s digital world. Unfortunately, mis-information seems to travel at the same speed, but higher volume than facts. 

As a nation we need an aggressively non-partisan strategic communications campaign that supports The US desired future position on the world stage while allowing the country to be well prepared to deal with the inevitable conflicts whether diplomatic, economic, or military.

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The Challenges and Opportunities of Strategic Messaging in Societal Level Competition

Curtis Pearson

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[1] Phase One Communications Inc. (2012), “China’s Space Program: Decision-Makers & Decision-Making”

[2] US Department of Defense, (November 2018) “Summary of the National Defense Strategy of The Unites States of America”

[3] The White House, ( March 2021) “Interim National Security Strategic Guidance”

[4] United Nations, UN Convention on Law of the Sea, Section 3 , https://www.un.org/Depts/los/convention_agreements/texts/unclos/UNCLOS-TOC.htm

[5] Anderson, E.C., Engstrom, J.G. “China’s Use of Perception Management and Strategic Deception Commission”, US-China Economic and Security Review Commission (November 2009)

Space Dominance In The Next Space Race: How Our Future Depends On Who Wins

Mr. Thomas R. Messegee

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The greatest challenge facing the U.S. when it comes to global competition is dominance of Space. Space is no longer a cooperative environment for commercialization and exploration, it is a battle-space, and China and Russia wish to militarize it. China sees space as the new South China Sea and does not intend to abide by treaties or respect our right to freely operate there. The loss of U.S. dominance in space to either Russia or China would not only be a disaster for the United States both strategically and economically, but for the entire free world. Our hopes for space as a place in which free enterprise and cooperative exploration can be realized relies on our investments now in our space infrastructure, how we teach our children to be inquisitive about science and technology and how we strive to develop the technologies of the future.

The United States was the first, and after more than 50 years, still the only nation to put a human on the moon. This event had many impacts on humanity, some direct, some indirect but most all for good. Its significance in history for our nation and for most other countries has been the opening of space for free commercial and scientific use by anyone with the desire and technological ability to explore and advance their national goals. This great expansion into space started as a race between the two post World War II superpowers the former Soviet Union and the United States vying to be the first nation to put humans on the moon. It culminated with the Apollo 11 landing and the failure of all four of the Soviet’s N1 rockets, the Soviet’s version of the Saturn V, that were intended to take Cosmonauts to the moon. Shortly after these events the Soviets ended their moon aspirations.

The first space race was over and the U.S. has maintained peaceful space dominance ever since that incredible day on July 20, 1969 when Neil Armstrong uttered his famous words “One small step for man, one giant leap for mankind”.  His words had a broader meaning than just an astronaut demonstrating the advancement of technology or accomplishing arguably the grandest feat of exploration ever committed to by a single nation. Armstrong claimed the moon for the world and space as free for all of humanity. For over fifty years it has been that way but now new and old actors on the stage of space exploration have emerged to challenge that dominance. Some with less than peaceful intent and with growing technological advantages that could overshadow all the gains we have made since the day Robert Goddard launched the world's first liquid-fuel rocket on March 16, 1926, in Auburn, Massachusetts.

The U.S. has maintained dominance in a mostly non-hostile, exploratory Space which is  an essential part of our lives. The information age in space has delivered GPS global positioning and the entire telecommunications network as a few examples of “things done in space” that are absolutely essential to daily life in the United States and around the world.  Now, with the highly publicized launch of Virgin Atlantic’s VSS Unity space plane and Blue Origin’s New Shepard rocket, the space tourism industry has been inaugurated. Not only is commercial space growing rapidly but the number of countries that are capable of putting things on the Moon, launching rockets with complex satellites, or building space stations is growing rapidly as well. Space is a vital national interest, and is a foundation to our economy and way of life, supporting our academic, agricultural, banking and travel sectors, among others. Moreover, the rapidly growing commercial space sector offers enormous promise for the prosperity of Americans and our global partners. The economy of space is rapidly growing to be a multi-trillion dollar industry.

The United States still has a lead in space, but that might not last long. Russia and China, for instance, are looking to asymmetrically undermine our space-based capabilities. China has expanded by orders of magnitude and the Russians have increased their capabilities as well. They have recently invested in space and developed some relatively sophisticated capabilities. But the scale of the Chinese investment is larger than everyone else out globally, including Russia. They have more rocket launches this year than the United States and are the lead rocket-launch nation in the world. As of March 2020, China began launching satellites every other week and by the end of that year had launched 35 satellites. The U.S. was a close second with 33. China and Russia are developing military capabilities, doctrine and organizations intended to place U.S. space systems at risk, including anti-satellite weapons, ground-launch missiles and directed energy weapons. Additionally, they continue to launch experimental satellites that conduct on-orbit activities to advance counter-space capabilities.

The DODs proposal for U.S. Space Force, establishment of U.S. Space Command as a unified command, and establishment of a Space Development Agency are all part of DODs efforts to move forward within this new reality. As of August 1st 2020 the U.S. owned and operated 1,425 of the 2,787 satellites currently in orbit. In order to protect these critical assets and expand our capabilities the United States must make investments in key space infrastructure. Our intellectual trust and our financial investments need to be focused in three areas to advance our interests in space; 1) Reducing the cost of launch systems and advancing space propulsion technologies, 2) Autonomous spacecraft operations through advancements in artificial Intelligence, deep learning and machine learning, 3)  Advanced on-orbit processing, data storage and quantum computing. The new second space race is underway, and who wins this time, is in many ways, far more important than who won the first space race. The choices we make in the next five to ten years will determine the outcome, the results of which, will impact our daily life directly. This is one race we absolutely can not afford to lose. 

 

Reducing the cost of launch systems and advancing new spacecraft propulsion technologies:

The United States currently performs approximately 30 satellite launch’s per year from all commercial and Governmental agencies. This number will likely grow by 5% to 10% each year for the next three to five years. China launched 35 satellites in 2020, but this constituted a growth of 40% in one year. Beijing will rapidly overtake our capabilities on orbit unless something changes. The good news is that we are making significant gains in rocket technology. To watch a SpaceX booster return from orbit and land on a floating recovery pad is impressive. On August 6th of this year SpaceX briefly constructed the largest rocket ever built by attaching the U.S. aerospace company's Starship spacecraft to the Super Heavy booster at its facility in Texas. The combined height of the structure was 400 feet, nearly 40 feet taller than the next largest Saturn V rocket built by NASA. It is an impressive sight to say the least. At the other end of the size spectrum the Pegasus XL boosters delivering small and medium Sat payloads to Low Earth Orbit (LEO) is another exciting and game changing technology.  Our newly constituted Space Force now operates on a 30 day launch call in which they can put a 900 lb payload into LEO.  That is really impressive considering most DoD Satellite programs of record take on average 10 years to field a new system. To sustain and build our space infrastructure though, the United States must drive down the cost of not only launching into LEO orbits, but taking greater advantage of MEO, GEO and CISLUNAR orbits on launch schedules that are competitive with the Russians and Chinese. We still hold technological advantage in this area driven by the free market and commercialization of space but that could be fleeting if we don’t continue to invest and encourage our commercial partners to strive for newer and better technologies.

Beyond Earth’s orbit we lose the advantage of being ahead in rocket propulsion technology. Here the Russians may be well ahead of us with systems designed for interplanetary travel. A ground-breaking Russian nuclear propulsion system for human space travel began ground-based testing in 2017 and will power a ship capable of long-haul interplanetary missions by 2025, giving Russia a head start in the outer-space race. The megawatt-class nuclear drive will function for up to three years and produce 100-150 kilowatts of energy at normal capacity. The new project proposes the use of an electric ion propulsion system. The engines exhaust thrust will be generated by an ion flow, which is further accelerated by an electric field.

NASA is laying the ground work for a return to the Moon as well as landing and returning from Mars and are in fact moving the ball forward with newly designed rocket propulsion systems. They know that these new lofty goals and incredible human achievements will not be accomplished with chemical rockets. Most mission profiles for a manned trip to Mars using a chemical rocket are 150 to 300 days. During this time the exposure of astronauts to cosmic rays (high-energy protons and atomic nuclei that move through space at nearly the speed of light) would not only be unhealthy to our crews but most likely deadly. Instead NASA and DARPA have begun investing in new propulsion technologies that will get us there quicker thereby minimizing exposure to ionizing radiation. DARPA’s DRACO program is working on a Nuclear Thermal Propulsion (NTP) system that will culminate in placing a rocket in cislunar space that will test out this new technology. Using Low Enriched Uranium (LEU) as a fuel, the reactor heats a hydrogen propellant that has twice the specific impulse (Isp) as a chemical rocket engine racing our Mars crews to the red planet in 30 days instead of seven months to a year. The impact of this effort on our ability to explore the outer solar system and potentially the stars beyond will be profound. Coupled with advances in Nuclear Electric Propulsion (NEP), a type of spacecraft propulsion system where thermal energy from a nuclear reactor is converted to electrical energy, which is used to drive an ion thrust or other electrical spacecraft propulsion technology, we are taking the necessary steps to build our critical space infrastructure and enable deep space exploration.

 

Autonomous spacecraft operations through advancements in artificial intelligence, deep learning and machine learning:

Our spacecraft are dumb, it’s a fact. If you don’t tell them what to do everyday almost hourly they stop working, degrade their orbits and in the case of LEO and MEO burn-in, or worse, in the case GEO, become space junk that must be avoided or destroyed. Even really expensive DoD spacecraft with the fastest radiation hardened processors and advanced flight software will only safe themselves long enough for humans to wake up and take some type of corrective action in the event of a spacecraft sub-system failure. In the space business we often wring our hands over the cost of boosters and satellites but one of the largest investments that must be included when we plan and build a satellite architecture is the cost of the ground system. We require large ground systems with communications and processing hardware and software to maintain the health and safety of our spacecraft, manage and direct their daily operations and to house the hundreds of employees tasked with keeping an eye on our valuable space assets (think NASA’s Mission Control in Houston like in the movie Apollo 13).

Imagine for a moment what an autonomous satellite network would look like with space vehicles that operated on a “launch and forget” philosophy. Continuous health status monitoring and decision making, autonomous switching to redundant systems, making microsecond decisions on vehicle maintenance routines like when to charge batteries, dump momentum or even fire thrusters to maintain orbit geometry.  These autonomous functions could potentially extend the life expectancy of a satellite by decades.

NASA sees these advantages as we begin to expand our exploration of the outer solar system. To land and operate a rover on the surface of Pluto, commands from mission control would take 5 1/2 hours to be received and the same amount of time to get the telemetry and data back. That’s just the time for the round trip of the communication signal and does not include the time it takes for the humans involved to decide what to do to prevent the rover from falling down a giant ice crevasse. Artificial Intelligence (AI) is the key to making our space infrastructure here close to the Earth far more resilient and to enable the technologies we need to explore the outer solar system, Kuiper belt and, one day, the stars.

 

Advanced on-orbit processing and quantum computing: 

I have left the most important advancement in space infrastructure for last for a reason, it is the enabler for everything else we must accomplish. To run advanced processing algorithms like spacecraft machine learning for autonomous spacecraft operations, precision control and sustainment of nuclear propulsion systems, establishing and maintaining micro servers in Earth orbit or on the Moon or Mars, we must invest in and significantly advance our capabilities for computer processing in space. In other words, we must push our processing to the edge of space. Vastly greater improvements in on-orbit processing is the single most enabling technology for everything else we want to do in space and will determine our position in the race for space dominance. There are many companies around the globe researching and developing advance processors for space and they all attack the problem with generally the same approach. A microprocessor with its millions of gates on Silicon substrate is prone to error and degradation in performance when subjected to high radiation fields. Space is filled with ionizing radiation of high-energy protons and atomic nuclei zipping through space at nearly the speed of light. The solution for most vendors of Technical Readiness Level (TRL-9) space qualified microprocessors is shielding, slower speeds and fewer transistor gates to be corrupted. We have yet to explore approaches like banks of multi-processors and server farms running parallel processes that average out errors by real-time co-correction comparison, advance error detection and correction codes far beyond the state-of-the-art in EDAC algorithms like Parity Checking, Cyclic Redundancy Check (CRC), Longitudinal Redundancy Check or Check Sum.  We need the next generation of genius computer scientists and mathematicians to solve some of the hard problems to advance this critical technology. We now are only beginning to grapple and wrap our arms around the fantastically futuristic field of Quantum Computing’s theoretically blinding processing speeds that make even PKI and almost all encryption regimes obsolete. Quantum computing can be a game-changer in such fields as cryptography and artificial intelligence when the technology becomes more mature.

 

Conclusion

So how do we want the story to end? Do we wish to keep space commercially and economically free, driven by a free market and our natural human curiosity to explore space and discover new worlds? Of course we do, but time is of the essence. We are at a critical decision point as a nation as to what investments we will make, what policies we will pursue and even how and in what direction we will encourage our children to pursue study. Are STEM subjects important enough to teach our children or are we willing to contract out to nations where science, technology, engineering and mathematics are treated as important? To build our critical space infrastructure, to tackle the hard problems, to develop, design and build new propulsion systems, AI algorithms, and advanced on-orbit processing capabilities, we need the best and the smartest minds that a free market and free people can provide.

We can still win this second space race but not only must we invest in new technologies and develop infrastructure that doesn’t exist today, we must also invest in the next generation of scientists and engineers. To quote the late great scientist Dr. Steven Hawking, “So remember to look up at the stars and not down at your feet. Try to make sense of what you see and hold on to that childlike wonder about what makes the universe exist.” I couldn’t agree more and it is the key to ensuring space remains free for commercial development and exploration by all nations and all free people on our planet. Encourage our children to learn, to be inquisitive about science and to earnestly pursue the answers to the mysteries of the world and space around us. Our freedom and our future depend on these investments in technology and in our children. It will determine whether or not their generation will take that next small step, and next giant leap for mankind.

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Space Dominance In The Next Space Race: How Our Future Depends On Who Wins

Mr. Thomas R. Messegee

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