In 1995 and 1996, the Institute conducted a study leading to a widely recognized report on dual use research. The study began with an intensive literature search centered on capturing the history of Department of Defense (DoD) investment in technologies that have commercial potential. The second part of the study reviewed case studies of DoD's Technology Reinvestment Project (TRP), whose mission was dual-use partnerships with industry. A distinguished Senior Military Industry Panel was formed to review the accumulated data and draw conclusions on the merit of dual-use research. This study has had pronounced impact on national policy. Congress adopted and integrated several of the conclusions of the study into the DoD FY '97 Authorization bill. The bill was subsequently signed into law by the President in September 1996.

Executive Summary of Dual-Use Report (PIPS-96-3): PDF 231K

DARPA's web site

The rate and impact of scientific breakthroughs and applications will continue to rise over the next twenty years, spawning immense changes to society that can be both crucially beneficial and tragically destructive. This growing and enduring trend, principally occurring outside of government, is producing both threats and solutions to our national security that are dramatically enhanced by emerging disruptive technologies. Our nation’s leadership needs considerable scientific and technological acumen to make balanced decisions and set national priorities - many of which are becoming increasingly technical in nature.

Yet, while political aspects of these issues are laboriously considered, even the foundational scientific arguments are infrequently well represented - too often there is no "scientist at the table." In fact, Congress exacerbated this situation by eliminating their Office of Technology Assessment (OTA) in 1995. More disturbing is the fact that policies that directly affect science and technology (S&T) - for instance, policies that encourage and capitalize the positive output of research, while mitigating its dark side - are too often fractional, and narrowly focused.

It is time to consider broadly based and collaborative, long-term (sustainable) policies to guide the nation’s decisions and its efforts to develop and exploit research for national security. We should explore the creation of a national security science and technology strategy that improves: scientific resources available to decision makers; understanding of national security science and technology needs; coordination and collaboration among science and technology providers; control of dangerous technologies; and technology prioritization and acquisition processes. We must also consider how to establish better relationships with the S&T communities in the private sector and abroad and how to create a dialog on fruitful use of their technical research and products.

In the pursuit of the "right" policies, we must balance the degree of government's influence over research and development against the dangers of inhibiting the freedom and ingenuity of U.S. scientists and engineers, who have made this the most technologically adept and enabled nation in the world.

Four goals of the study are:

• Document likely S&T trends and their impacts on national security over the next 20 years
• Develop recommendations to optimize governmental employment of S&T in decision-making and influence of S&T research
• Deliver a proposed national security S&T strategy, enabling policies, and an implementation plan
• Consider effects of and influence on foreign R&D - European Perspective

The Potomac Institute for Policy Studies (the Institute) was asked to perform a six-month study of technology transition at the Defense Advanced Projects Agency (DARPA), Transitioning DARPA Technology. In this project, the Institute developed and documented an understanding of how well DARPA has transitioned these products into military systems over the past forty years. The report also addresses how that mission has been affected by the nature of the Agency and its output, and by the environment in which it operates.

The study had four goals:

• to examine DARPA's history of transition to its military customer
• to empirically identify transition paths and strategies employed by DARPA
• to identify factors that affect DARPA's transition rates and to cite recent changes in those factors
• to suggest how DARPA might improve transition

In order to accomplish the four study goals, Dr. James Richardson, Diane Larriva, and Stephanie Tennyson drew from the wisdom of past studies but also collected additional data, and developed a nomenclature for understanding and assessing DARPA's transition record. They compiled a list of 124 transitioned DARPA programs, but concentrated on two subsets of this program population. The first set, programs transitioned during the last decade (1990s), was chosen because it was deemed to be easier to obtain information on these programs rather than on earlier decades. The second program population, a subset of the last decade, is the New Starts (or initiatives) begun during Fiscal Year (FY) 1991. For this subset, the research team tracked eighteen new starts, objectively selected with no bias toward either success or failure, until they transitioned products, failed and were abandoned, or continued development with a Service lab.

Assessing transition performance for a research and development (R&D) organization, particularly one with DARPA's mission and operational strategies, is an inexact and argumentative undertaking—not given to a “single number” answer. After much thought, data collection, and analysis, the researchers came to believe that DARPA's transition record should be viewed from many perspectives and that the best way to judge its accomplishments is through a composite of these views. Four perspectives were chosen that together describe DARPA's transition performance and affect the standards of success under which it should be judged. The four were: (1) total number of products transitions to the military services by DARPA; (2) rate of transition, in terms of transitions per number of program initiated; (3) quality of products; and (4) other factors that affect transition. However, for the most part, that judgment remains somewhat subjective, principally because of the difficulties in arriving at an objective standard for success. Analysis of DARPA's record from the four perspectives led the researchers to the conclusion that the Agency's transition performance has been impressive. Moreover, there is ample evidence of many uncounted successful transitions, particularly during DARPA's early history.

To define frequently used transition paths, the team investigated the three canonical transition paths: (1) DARPA-to-Service Acquisition (DSA), (2) DARPA-to-Industry-to Service acquisition (DIS), and (3) DARPA-to-Service Science and Technology (DS&T). The main factor in determining these paths was the financial support of the product once it left DARPA. The report offers examples of products that have transitioned by each path. The report further shows how the paths examined for the 1990s Decade products had some unique features.

The team analyzed the factors that either impede or improve transition potential at DARPA. Some of these factors stem from DARPA's mission or organizational characteristics and policies. Others are part of the environment under which the Agency must transition its products. They also looked at changes in these factors that have occurred as the result of new trends in our world during the past ten years—changes in political, military, business, and R&D environments that have, or should have, affected transition. Some of the main organizational characteristics of DARPA's mission elements were the pursuit of radical innovation with high risk/high pay-off programs and seeking solutions to national level problems. Other factors include high program manager turnover, neglect to credit sponsorship, consortia, and flexible contracting procedures. The report also documents the impact of the environment in which DARPA must operate on transition. Such factors include timing, regulations, customer, and budgetary considerations.

The principal finding of the study is that DARPA's transition performance has been excellent over the past forty years, inserting over 120 products or technologies into fielded systems (about 3 per year). During the past decade, the Agency's record has been even better, about 5 per year. Finally, where data was available, we calculated transition rates and found them to be at a level exceptionally high according to industry's standards. Considering DARPA's other missions and its responsibility to foster high-risk/high-payoff ideas, the Institute's team considers these statistics quite impressive.

Overall, transition at DARPA is an opportunistic pursuit, greatly enhanced by skilled and dedicated DARPA and industry program manager and Service agent teams. It is likely that any structure or procedure that limits the program manager's sense of responsibility or options to transition his or her products will negatively affect the Agency's rate of transition.

Finally, the report offers some suggestions on implementing changes to DARPA's transition strategies and policies. Each recommendation is discusses in light of the team's findings and analyses, as well as other studies. Recommendations include maximizing the effectiveness of the DARPA and industry program manager and Service agent team, and exploiting recent avenues of transition initiated by OSD and the Military Services. Furthermore, the report also recommends developing a better system of tracking and recording transitions and lessons learned, and integrating the results, as well as ensuring sufficient technological maturity of products.

Executive Summary: PDF 1.86MB/19 pgs

The Weapons of Mass Destruction Study focuses on the technical and operational shortfalls surrounding the detection of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). It explores the detection capabilities available as well as the relevant research and development being conducted throughout the federal labs and private sector facilities in the U.S. Out of this effort will emerge an identification of current gaps in detection capabilities and an agenda for future WMD detection investment.

Commissioned by the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA), the study completed its second phase. The first phase of this project focused on gathering information on the shortcomings of the U.S. ability to detect WMD. Dr. David Kay, designed a methodical plan based on sound scientific methodology and techniques to determine the validity and extent of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) in Iraq. Then Potomac Institute staff member and former UN Weapons Inspector, Dr. Kay, traveled to Iraq to observe and analyze the post-war policing of the battlefield and the ongoing WMD detection efforts. There, he conducted interviews with U.S. forces and personnel engaged in weapon detection efforts. With the information gathered in these interviews, he presented a series of briefings to the U.S. government on the situation in Iraq. Immediately after Dr. Kay's briefing to the Intelligence Community, he was appointed a special advisor to the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) and sent to Iraq to lead the WMD survey team. Dr. Kay has since rejoined the Potomac Institute.

Part of the Institute's study included a conference to bring together pertinent subject matter experts from the Department of Defense (DoD), the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA), and the Department of Energy (DOE), as well as former weapons inspectors and cutting-edge technologists. By aggregating the ideas and experiences of all these disciplines, a list of systemic process shortcomings and technology gaps were identified as problem areas within the detection process. Some of the shortfalls that were acknowledged included: the inability to analyze water, soil and air samples from a stand-off range; the difficulty in monitoring the movements of key personnel involved with the creation of WMD; and the problem of overcoming denial and deception techniques used by adversaries.

Phase II of the study focused on investigating what technologies are available or being developed that could aid the U.S. in the detection of WMD. The Potomac Institute visited the major national research facilities and met with researchers to gain knowledge of technologies in existence or under development/consideration that could aid detection efforts. It is the Institute's belief that we need to arm our decision makers and intelligence community with better tools to gain rich insights into what countries and terrorist groups are doing. This study hopes to start that process.

Project Events : The Potomac Institute held a WMD Detection conference on June 23, 2004 focusing on the problems faced by weapons inspectors operating in Iraq from 1991-2003. The outcome of this effort identified a number of key problems that are associated with the detection of WMD.